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Interview with George Giacaman 
 
Marie Breen-Smyth, University of Surrey 
 
 
Marie Breen-Smyth interviews George Giacaman, the Co-Founder and Director of 
Muwatin, The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy. George is a prominent 
commentator on public affairs in the Palestinian and Arab press, is a regular commentator 
for BBC TV and World Service Radio and has authored a number of key works including his 
most recent book " Before and After Arafat: Political Transformation during the Second 
Intifada" (2011, in Arabic). He is editor of On the Democratic Option, and Co-editor of 
After Oslo, and State Formation in Palestine, and has published extensively in both English 
and Arabic. His areas of interest include democratization, the role and function of civil 
society, Palestinian political development, Islamic philosophy, contemporary philosophical 
and intellectual trends. George is co-founder of the the MA Program in Democracy and 
Human Rights in the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies at Birzeit University.  
He has also served as Dean of Graduate Studies, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, and Chair of 
the  Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies at Birzeit. He holds a Ph.D in 
Philosophy from The State University of New York at Buffalo, where he also taught for 
three years before moving to Birzeit. 
 
Marie Breen-Smyth:      What now are the key factors or drivers in Palestinian politics 
that determine the possibility of progress towards a settlement?  
George Giacaman: The PLO began a gradual process of inching towards the two state 
solution since the mid 1970's, but became formally part of its political program in 1988 
during the meeting of the Palestinian National council (the PLO's "parliament") in Algiers 
where the principle of the division of Palestine was accepted. Since then, the PLO 
pursued a settlement based on this but was faced with Israeli rejectionism. It took 
former US Secretary of State James Baker multiple visits to the region and intensive 
pressure on the then government of Israel to agree to take part in the Madrid 
Conference which took place in late 1991. This was followed by the Oslo accords, the 
first of which was signed in 1993 and involved the recognition by the PLO of the State of 
Israel, while Israel recognized the PLO as a representative of Palestinians, but did not 
recognize their right to self-determination, let alone that they have a right to a state. 
 
This has been the trajectory of the PLO since, to seek a settlement along these lines. 
Even Hamas has accepted the two-state solution during the past few years as can be 
amply documented, even if with the qualifier that they, that is Hamas, will not recognize 
Israel. But no one asked right-wing Israeli parties, including those now in government, to 
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recognize the Palestinian's right to a state, which indeed they do not.     
 
 Palestinian politics do not influence progress towards a settlement to any significant 
degree, but other factors do, including the position of the US on issues. The US has 
opted to be supportive of various Israeli governments, no matter how extreme, largely 
because of the influence of the Israel lobby on Congress and the various administrations. 
In the case of the Obama Administration, this is patently clear: Netanyahu, so to speak, 
beat Obama on his home ground. The US is hostage to Israel as far as the conflict is 
concerned. A sorry and pitiful sight indeed for a great power and to the detriment of 
Israel and the US, something which many Israelis also believe.  
 
MBS: What, in your view are the implications of the Arab revolutions for progressing 
the cause of Palestine? 
 
GG: The Arab uprisings or revolutions as they are referred to in Egypt, are still in a state 
of flux. Egypt will lead the way and is bound to become a model. Counter-revolutionary 
forces, both internal and external, are now at work including some sponsored by Arab 
regimes in alliance with the US. The crux of the matter is the degree of democratization 
that transpires after elections in Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries, and the extent to 
which  public opinion is reflected in domestic and foreign policies, including in relation 
to Israel and Palestine. To the degree that this takes place, this will be advantageous to 
Palestinians since Arab public opinion has always been known to be supportive of the 
Palestinian cause, but the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world that are under the 
hegemony of the US made sure that this popular sentiment did not affect their policies. 
Egypt under Mubarak, is obviously a clear case in point, but also are several other Arab 
countries where this applies. 
 
After the elections of new parliaments in Egypt, Tunisia and other countries, and if 
elections are not rigged, one should expect that there will be demands for change of 
policies on the part of the newly elected parliaments. On the whole, therefore, the 
prospects appear propitious from a Palestinian perspective, but it will take some time 
for the US to begin changing its policies in the region, specifically in relation to the 
conflict in Palestine. But there is a good chance that such a change will take place in the 
medium term. 
 
MBS:  How do you regard the Palestinian Authority’s campaign at the United Nations 
for Palestinian statehood? 
 
GG: After twenty years of negotiations since the Madrid Conference in late 1991, the PA 
does not have another twenty years for further negotiations while Israel continues 
building illegal settlements that undermine any possible peace agreement -  except one 
completely on its own terms. This situation has led to the loss of credibility and indeed 
raised questions about the legitimacy of the continued existence of the PA.   For 
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Palestinians never envisioned that the PA should exist permanently as a large 
municipality to administer the affairs of Palestinians, under Israeli sovereignty.  
With the deadlock in political negotiations after Obama gave in to internal pressure by 
the various Israel lobbies, including a majority in Congress who act as lobbyists for a 
foreign government, the PA reached a point of crisis. The move for statehood at the UN 
was meant to begin a process of partial extrication of the conflict from the straight 
jacket of bilateral negotiations that had led to nowhere. It was meant to generate a 
diplomatic crisis, in part, in the hope that it will prod the US and major European 
countries into a different kind of involvement by declaring a clear position on the frame 
of reference for any future negotiations. This aspired to halt the expansion of illegal 
settlements and to confirm that the 1967 lines are the starting point of negotiations.    
 
This was a bold gamble on the part of the PA because it brings it into conflict with the 
US, given the US aversion to the use of its veto power in the Security Council. This is 
especially acute, given the changing political scene in several Arab countries, where 
public opinion is likely to be more vociferous in opposition to US support for Israel.  As 
of the end of December 2011, the application for recognition is still under discussion by 
the various committees of the Security Council. It also appears that the US has 
succeeded in convincing several members of the Security Council not to give a positive 
response for the application. Since nine members positive response are needed for the 
application to go for a vote, the US may have succeeded in averting a veto. 
 
The main issue here, however, is what next. Will the PA submit an application to the 
General Assembly for recognition?  Will the PA follow up with further diplomatic moves 
if negotiations remain stalled, or not? Further moves of a political or legal nature, such 
as pursuing the Goldstone report in the relevant UN bodies to which it will be entitled 
after joining them once it has observer status , will put it in direct conflict with Israel and 
the US, even more so than the bid for recognition. It remains to be seen if the PA has 
the political will to take such a course, but its options are limited and it cannot continue 
to tolerate the present status quo since ultimately, it will lose control of the “street” and 
with it whatever internal legitimacy it has left.   
 
MBS: What is the likely outcome in terms of Israel’s status with the international 
community? 
 
GG:  Israel is experiencing a state of relative political isolation which will continue to 
increase if the political process remains stalled. This is the combined view of all Israeli 
security services as was reported in the Hebrew press on the eve of the PA’s bid at the 
UN. However, it will take more concrete damage to the State of Israel to make the 
present government take an initiative, since this is a government that has opted so far 
for political paralysis given its composition as a coalition with extreme right wing parties, 
more interested in land usurpation from Palestinians than peace  A reshuffle of the 
cabinet and inclusion of other parties is not impossible at one point, but for whatever 
reason, Netanyahu has not yet decided that this is the most opportune moment, 
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especially since the inclusion of other parties, such as Kadima, will entail a political price 
of the type demanded in earlier negotiations before the formation of the present 
government, such as rotation on the position of prime minister, which he did not accept. 
 
MBS: How do you assess the prospects for re-starting a peace process in the region? 
 
GG:  Since the Madrid Conference in late 1991, there has been twenty years of 
"negotiations". The phrase "peace process" has become a stale and decrepit euphemism 
for "conflict management", meaning not resolution of the conflict but preventing it from 
exacerbation and under "control." After twenty years, the "peace process" has run its 
course and came to an end as an on-going process with no definite end in sight. Any 
revival of such a process will have to be on very different terms. All concerned know this, 
but the US and the EU and the Quartet are still trying to revive a dead process because 
they have no leverage with the State of Israel, meaning to play a clearly assertive role 
that puts clear pressure on the Israeli government to pursue a settlement, even while 
they continue to claim that the outlines of a settlement are clearly known.   
 
Public opinion in the US and more so in Europe is supportive of the two-state solution 
and the recognition of Palestine as a state. This is not reflected in governmental policies. 
So much for "democracies".   
 
MBS: In the light of US foreign policy towards the Middle East and Israel since the 
election of Obama, can you be optimistic the prospects for ending the occupation? 
 
GG:  Given the record of the Obama Administration so far, there is no reason to be 
optimistic. The Palestinian Authority (PA), but not necessarily Palestinians, may be 
hoping that if Obama wins a second term, he might be more assertive in relation to any 
one Israeli government. But there is no evidence for this, and it could be viewed as 
"hope against hope". What Palestinians need to do is to use whatever sources of 
strength they have and, hopefully, be empowered by the changing scene in Arab 
Countries. This will be a crucial factor in the medium and long term. 
 
MBS:  How do you see current and future trends in Israeli settlement building? 
 
GG: The settlement process and illegal land appropriation from Palestinians continue, 
and there is no reason to expect that they will stop as long as there are no sanctions for 
such an endeavor. This has been the case since 1967 when Israel occupied Palestinian 
land, in this case, the West bank and Gaza, and was actually exacerbated during the Oslo 
process, and continues apace now. There is no peace strategy for Israel especially with 
the government under Netanyahu, and from the perspective of many Israelis as well, 
this appears to be to the detriment of the state of Israel as this will ensure that it will 
have to live indefinitely by the sword. A very sorry and tragic prospect indeed, and 
Palestinians will pay the heavier price, and the conflict will continue to radicalize the 
Arab region, especially if some degree of democratization is ushered in.  
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The present course appears to be sheer lunacy for all concerned, including many sane 
Israelis. And if a majority in the US Congress think they are helping Israel by rubber-
stamping any policy any Israeli government pursues, they are in reality pursuing an anti-
Israeli policy if by that is meant Israel not perpetually being at war, hot or cold, with the 
region surrounding it, not only with Palestinians.  This will become clearer in the coming 
months and years.   
 
MBS: What is the role of politics versus armed resistance in the Palestinian struggle? 
Our journal operates in the field of so called 'terrorism studies' - can the 
term 'terrorism' be usefully applied to the Palestinian and Israeli contexts? Is Hamas' 
designation as a terrorist organisation a help or a hindrance to the peace process? 
What effects does it generate and what can be done to work around this obstacle? 
 
GG: Both politics and armed resistance have been pursued by Palestinians. Both have 
failed in achieving the aims of the PLO, which is to establish a sovereign state within the 
1967 lines. The reason for this is obvious: Palestinians are no match for Israel in terms of 
political and military power.  Without Arab support of various kinds they will not achieve 
their aims. After the Arab uprisings the scene is bound to change, even if the degree is 
yet not known. Analysts in Israel and the US are well aware of this and their 
governments are trying their best to contain the change in so far as possible.  But it is 
clear that increased support for the Palestinians by Arab regimes, at least at the 
diplomatic level, will be a feature of the new order in Arab countries as a result of the 
uprisings.  The degree of support will depend on the degree of democratization.  
 
Now, as for the word “terrorism”, there are varied politically inspired  definitions, such 
as the one the US  politicians use, which is not only tendentious but also morally 
unjustifiable. It is unjustifiable in that it equates, more or less, armed resistance to the 
US in its Middle Eastern wars, and Israeli wars, with terrorism, if it also involves attacks 
on civilians. Such attacks are used to lump together different categories of those 
targeted, both civilian and military,  while at the same time absolving states, such as the 
US and Israel  from similar perpetrated acts which also involve targeting civilians.  
 
What is generally agreed upon as a core definition of terrorism, is targeting civilians as 
prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention.   But Israel is obviously guilty of this. The 
list is long, but suffice it to mention the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 which resulted in 
the death of nearly 20 thousand, mostly civilians, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 
where the majority of those killed or injured were civilians, and the invasion of Gaza in 
2007 with approximately 1400 killed, mostly civilians. And the list can start earlier and 
go on. 
 
The question is this:  What Is terrorism ? If it means targeting civilians, then Israel is 
equally guilty of the charge, and more so in terms of numbers.  If it is argued that Israel 
did not intend to attack civilians while Palestinians did, the question revolves around 
6 
 
what intent  is.  It should be obvious that intent is not established by a psychological 
test. From the point of view of law, intent is established if the results of the action can 
be foreseen. In the case of the war on Gaza and in other wars, the results were foreseen 
and this can be amply documented from Israeli sources as well.  
 
The main issue here is one of double standards. If Palestinians target civilians it is 
terrorism, while if Israel does, it is not. This is a morally obtuse position, and even worse, 
it is downright moral cynicism.  I repeat, the central issue here is one of double 
standards and therefore not morally defensible. 
 
MBS: What is the proper role of the international community in resolving the situation 
of Palestine? 
 
GG: The “international community” is a euphemism for the Security Council and major 
European countries and of the balance of power within the world today. With veto 
power for permanent members of the Security Council, the US as a leading member of 
the “international community” used its veto over 40 times to protect Israel from 
condemnation. The EU and major European countries have so far played “second fiddle” 
to the US and have not pursued an independent policy. What is very ironic in this 
context, is that major European countries have been content to support the Palestinian 
authority (PA) financially, thus relieving Israel of its financial obligations as an occupying 
power (at least after the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank in 2002), but at the 
same time, to invert the American saying, they paid the piper but did not call the tune. 
 
If this remains the case, then the US will continue to call the shots, and the 
“international community” will follow in its wake.  The proper role, what ought to be 
done, however, is that pressure should be brought on the State of Israel to make peace 
with Palestinians along lines that most European countries maintain they are already 
known, and indeed also by many former US politician, ambassadors, officials, and 
Presidential advisers. 
 
MBS: What is your attitude to the two state solution? 
 
GG: In spite of the fact that during the past two years many commentators, including 
Palestinians, advocated the one-state solution, on the assumption that the two-state 
solution is very nearly dead, Palestinian public opinion in the West Bank and Gaza is still 
in support of it by a clear majority as appears in the most recent opinion polls. In my 
opinion, the reason for this is that most Palestinians are pragmatic and can see that if 
the two-state solution appears far off, the other options are even less realistic in the 
near future.  
 
One should also add that all political parties within the PLO, in addition to Hamas, still 
advocate, or accept the two-state solution. The reason for this is clear given that this is 
the solution accepted internationally, including by the US and the EU, for the conflict. Its 
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political marketability is the reason, aside from whether it is achievable and possible. In 
my view it is achievable, but it requires a considerable amount of pressure on Israel for 
it to be realized, mainly by the US and major European countries, as well as Arab 
countries. So far, the political will is not there.  But given the uprisings in the Arab World, 
any degree of democratization in Egypt and other countries, will bring about a strategic 
shift in the relation with the US. From a longer term perspective, the US cannot secure 
its interests in the region while maintaining its present unquestioning support of Israel’s 
illegal occupation of Palestinian land. Many American observers see this clearly but it is 
yet to influence policy and politicians. 
 
The same applies in Israel. What has taken place during the last few decades is that the 
State of Israel has succeeded far too well,  in neutralizing any possible outside pressure 
principally in the US, thanks largely to the influence various Israel lobbies on Congress 
and within the Administration.  As a result, the conflict has been transposed into the 
domestic Israeli political arena, where the interests of politicians and parties are local, 
electoral, careerist, and short term. But once the conflict has entered this dark tunnel of 
Israeli politics, it will not emerge from there without outside pressure. This is where 
things are at present. And I would add, this is to the detriment of the future of the State 
of Israel in the region, as many sane Israelis also believe.  But it is precisely this success 
of the State of Israel in warding off any possible external pressure, that is one main 
reason for the electoral drift towards the extreme right wing in Israel.  With such 
“friends” in the US Congress, Israel does not need any enemies.  
 
MBS: How do you see the respective roles of the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, Fatah 
and Hamas in Palestinian politics? What are the prospects for reconciliation between 
Fatah and Hamas? 
 
GG: There were several attempts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, including 
the last agreement signed under Egyptian prodding in May 2011. The agreement is yet 
to be put into effect, and will not be in the near future as this will require both sides to 
abandon their present alliances. The PA has not been willing so far to part ways with the 
US, and Hamas will not abandon its regional alliances in the absence of a settlement to 
the conflict where its role and standing are clear. I expect that reconciliation will take 
place under two conditions: if a Palestinian state is established, then there will be 
serious negotiation between Hamas and Fatah about the place of Hamas in the State. 
And if the political process remains deadlocked, at some point some factions within 
Fatah will revert to some form of resistance program, at which point both will be able to 
reconcile some of their differences. 
 
 At present, we are in an interim period, and the effort of the PA to go to the UN is in 
part an attempt to fill the political vacuum that has resulted because of the breakdown 
of the political process.  Again, this is an interim period, even if it lasts for a few years. 
But it is also a dangerous period given the political vacuum which in the past has been 
filled by conflict. I think everyone concerned understands this, but a state of paralysis 
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grips the major actors, principally because of the hold Israel has over US policy in 
relation to the conflict.  The new factor is the uprisings in several Arab countries which 
can have a strategic influence, even if in stages, but it is not possible at present to tell in 
detail the degree of change they will usher in.    
 
MBS: How do you assess the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, and the challenges for 
any successor? 
 
GG: Mahmoud Abbas has pursued a course based on negotiations and was against the 
“militarization” of the second Intifada as he called it. He was almost completely 
neglected by Israel after his elections in January 2005, until Hamas gained a majority in 
PLC elections in January 2006. Thereafter, he continued to follow the same course until 
the ”Annapolis process”, the negotiations that began in early 2008 and ended in failure 
at the end of the same year. Then, two years into the Obama Administration, it became 
clear to him that no process will be afoot with the extreme right wing government in 
Israel, given the capitulation of President Obama in the face of internal domestic 
pressures. Hence, the decision to go the UN was his first bold move, born in desperation 
rather than hope.  But it also required leadership and courage as it was the first move 
that put him to some degree in conflict with the US and Israel. Whether he will follow it 
with other bold moves is an open question.   
 
In the absence of a credible political process, any successor to Abbas will face the same 
daunting challenges.  And it will take a very brave fellow indeed who would want to 
swim close to the rocky and jagged reef that ruptured Abbas’ hopes asunder.    
 
George Giacaman and Marie Breen-Smyth met in Birzeit and Ramallah in September and 
December 2011.  
